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INTRODUCTION
The recent introduction of High Speed Vessels (HSV) into military service is the most exciting thing to happen to the surface fleet since the introduction of the Aegis radar system. Already, the performance of the HSV-X1 Joint Venture and similar ships during Operation Iraqi Freedom has made many stand up and take notice of the capabilities these vessels bring to the warfighter. While it may be a stretch to call speed by itself "transformational", it is fair to say that the wave-piercing catamaran, in conjunction with other Navy initiatives in the rotary wing and special warfare arenas, promises to significantly transform the way the Navy does business in the littorals.
However, there stands a divergence on how these ships should be employed in a joint 
HSV CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT
The current generation of military High-Speed Vessels (HSV) is based on technology fully developed by the commercial sealift industry. Substantially developed in the 1980s, the Australian firm Incat's wave-piercing catamaran is one of the most commercially practical hull forms for speed with relative economy. The Incat-built catamaran MV Cat-Link V currently holds the transatlantic crossing speed record of 39.897 knots, set in 1998.
Military experimentation with the HSV concept began in 1999 with the Australian Navy's HMAS Jervis Bay, placed in service in response to the crisis in East Timor. In 2001, the Marine Corps leased the catamaran Westpac Express to ferry troops and equipment to training areas in the Western Pacific. Soon after, the Army leased the Joint Venture (HSVXl) and Spearhead (TSV-1X) from Incat for joint experimentation. The Army has driven much of the interest in high speed ships in an effort to shrink its deployment timeline. By developing lighter units, enhancing pre-positioned stocks, and introducing high speed intratheater sealift, the Army hopes to deploy a medium-sized force in 96 hours, a division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days. The Joint Venture played a Special Operations role in the first days of the war, serving as a "mother ship" for SEALs and their watercraft operating against the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr in a micro-version of the Navy's Sea Basing operational concept. "What we did near Umm Qasr was historic," said LCDR Tom Rancich, in charge of future operations for the Naval Special Warfare Task Group. "We've never had 14 small boats operating independently of the big navy for seven days, unresupplied." "* Low maintenance helicopter deck with hangar facilities for two MH-60 airframes "* Strengthened roll-on/roll-off vehicle ramp to accommodate MlAl main battle tank "* Enhanced stem crane for small craft operations Since the ship design was heavily modeled on existing commercial technology, the order-to-delivery cycle was just ten months, even with 75 Navy-requested design changes during construction. It best represents the type of vessel that the Joint Force Commander can expect to employ in the next major operation and its capabilities will provide the basis for later discussion on operational employment. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the unique catamaran hull design and interior layout. 6 The Swift's pertinent specifications are shown in Table 1 . Clearly, the HSV-X2 Swift is quite swift at over 46 knots and she is at least as fast as the Spearhead, which maintained 48.7 knots in a high speed run off Qatar in 2003.7 The ship is lightly armed and her weaponry is primarily for self-defense. She carries a 25mm stabilized gun forward and additional crew-served .50 caliber weapons aft. The helicopter deck is certified for the H-46 and H-60 helicopters in addition to several smaller airframes. A key capability is her innovative hangar facilities that allow for storage and maintenance of two of the new MH-60S helicopters. The hangar door is a curtain to save weight while still protecting aircraft from the elements. The 12 foot draft allows access to ports denied to deep draft sealift. Moreover, the HSV extends its operating reach into far more littoral areas than current possible with frigates and destroyers. This capability is important for two reasons.
First, the decreased draft will allow the HSV to traverse large expanses of shallow seas, enabling the already speedy vessel to cut comers where deeper draft ships must proceed around. Second, the ability to get close to the shoreline and traverse the riverine environment means she can support helicopter and personnel operations farther inland than other ships with helicopter assets, extending the operational reach of the joint force. In summary, the key capabilities that the Swift brings to the fight are speed, cargo/troop carrying capacity, helicopter facilities, and shallow draft. deployment and sustainment, the JFMCC will have a few for ASW/SUW/MCM/MIO, the JFSOCC will have some for SOF insertion and support, and the remainder may be devoted solely to intra-theater logistics support. Available HSV sorties would be offered up to the JFMCC at the parent component commander's discretion, similar to how the Marine AirGround Task Force (MAGTF) commander volunteers fixed-wing assets to the JFACC.
Alternatively, the CJTF can assign all HSV assets to the JFMCC, who would employ HSV in the most effective manner overall to achieve the Joint Task Force (JTF) objective.
The JFMCC would coordinate with the other component commanders beginning in the earliest planning stages to determine how the HSV should be employed throughout the operation. Each phase of the operation would be analyzed to see which HSV missions were heavily emphasized and which were not, so that HSV missions could be apportioned differently as the operation progresses. For example, given an expeditionary scenario, the first phase would most likely focus on force deployment and sea control aspects, with occasional clandestine insertion of Special Forces units. The second phase may introduce NEO and MCM, emphasize SOF insertion, but de-emphasize deployment. By Phase 3, HSVs may be heavily used in helicopter lily pad and riverine operations and in support of large troop redeployments while guarding against a small craft SUW thieat. The final phase would involve re-deployment to a regeneration staging area and humanitarian logistics support.
It is clear that the various missions have a different emphasis based on the phase of the operation. Therefore, split apportionment of HSV assets among the components for the duration of an operation would be an ineffective way to employ them. While it gives combatant commanders direct control over assigned assets, which increases responsiveness, it does not enable effective synchronization of maritime efforts. The sea is a vast maneuver area and the threat environment can change rapidly. Apportionment stovepipes will not only inhibit synergistic use of assets but will adversely affect HSV force protection efforts as well.
The JFLCC may have vessels dashing unprotected through an ASW threat area and have no knowledge of a small boat threat that has recently emerged at a troop redeployment objective. Most important, however, this method of apportionment does not allow for flexible and scalable application of combat and transport power based on the changing needs of the operation. Apportionment of assets would be based on initial planning assumptions and actual events would likely dictate reapportionment during the operation. This reapportionment, conducted in an ad-hoc manner through discussions (possibly heated) between combatant commanders, would fail to exploit opportunities in a timely fashion due to friction inherent in the process. Moreover, even if the component commanders were earnest about offering available sorties to the JFMCC, it is likely that the ships would not be that the HSV's multi-mission capability is dependant to a large degree on which helicopters are assigned. Thus, the problem is not just a hull apportionment problem; it's a helicopter apportionment problem as well. The JFMCC is in the best position to manage helicopter assignment and rotation based on mission and threat assessment at the time, given the array of sea based rotary-wing assets available to the JFMCC. For example, it's relatively easy to shift an MH-60S to an HSV to perform an inshore logistics mission from another ship whose role is not as critical at that phase of the operation. The flexibility of "plug and play" aviation for the HSV enables the JFMCC to optimize HSV utilization for the JTF.
JFMCC ORGANIZATION
It is one thing to say JFMCC is the best candidate for HSV management, but quite another to say that current JFMCC doctrine is up to the task. The Navy has had a reputation for years that it is the "least joint" of all the services. As CAPT Gary Though these are all valid concerns, they can be alleviated or mitigated by an effective and responsive JFMCC organization. One can look to the successful evolution of the JFACC concept for gifidance. In fact, in discussing the proposed Maritime Tasking Order (MTO), the draft JFMCC Joint Pub 3-32 states: "The MTO process is very similar to the Air Tasking Order (ATO) process, which governs air operational planning, produces a daily air operations plan and a supporting plan. The MTO governs the parallel development of operational planning for a three-day period and results in a composite of intended maritime activity across all 12 warfare maritime force operations areas for an additional 24 hours."' 1 '
Since the HSV can do so much for so many, it is imperative that the JFMCC staff be properly 14 configured for the tasking expected of them. It will also need to ensure that an adequate number of helicopters by variant are available for assignment to the HSVs. Some helicopters require kits that can add capability but require time for outfitting. The Current Plans Cell will ensure that missions are properly paired with the appropriate vessel and rotary-wing assets.
Also, the JFMCC staff must properly sequence and synchronize HSV missions, so the right HSVs end up in a materially and geographically feasible position for follow-on missions. HSVs are rapidly reconfigurable, but excess reconfiguration carries a cost in resources. This is best handled through the creation of a HSV specialist billet on the JFMCC staff, which would be responsible for coordination of vessel and rotary wing assets and liaison with other component staffs on HSV missions. This effort is critically important, since the JFMCC will need to rely much more heavily on coordination and input from the staff Liaison Officers (LNOs) than it ever has in the past. It is very likely that the HSVs will spend much of their time in direct cross-component support, with some missions requiring cross-decked personnel and aviation assets from other component commanders. In fact, the HSV specialist will infuse judgment into the process, when it makes sense to keep a specific HSV employed within one component for mission familiarity reasons or when a vessel must be "fenced-off' to a specific component during a critical phase of the operation.
This may be a difficult practice to instill in a staff that heretofore was focused on carrier battle group employment, but it will become a routine evolution given time and practice, as the JFMCC 9taff will come to enjoy the flexibility that the multi-mission HSV provides. Also, since multi-service rotary wing aviation is interoperable with the HSV, JFMCC planners will often find themselves in a pinch for JFMCC airframes only to find a few extra through their LNO chain. In fact, the HSV may very well provide the necessary impetus for change in the JFMCC culture, instilling true jointness and setting the stage for even greater success in the Sea Basing concept of the future.
OPERATIONAL VIGNETTE
To illustrate HSV planning and execution concerns, HSV cross-component employment under the JFMCC will be demonstrated through a hypothetical vignette. In this scenario, a squadron of eight HSVs with characteristics identical to the HSV-X2 Swift will be deployed as part of a Joint Task Force.
In the summer of June 2005, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (see Figure 7 for area map) 13 was thrown into chaos after the nation's three largest rebel factions united around opposition leader General Rafael Mombaso and overthrew the legitimate government. and the HSV's ability to launch its MH-60S helos for a sector search, then zig-zag ahead at 45 knots to recover them meant much more area could be searched per day than ever possible with the slower monohull escort ships. In fact, one of the HSV-launched helos had a sonobuoy hit on the second day of search operations and quickly located the first Romeo. It was harassed by airborne active dipping sonar for 36 hours then departed for home, tracked by South African based P-3 patrol aircraft as it headed south. The second sub soon followed.
Another HSV was performing an SUW screen of the sea base 25 miles east when an MH-60R detected two DRC Shanghai II patrol craft out of Luanda. One was destroyed by a Penguin missile, while the other made it back to base and never again strayed outside the mouth of the Congo River.
At the start of Phase II, the focus shifted to seizing the port cities of Luanda and Point
Noire to use as Sea Ports of Debarkation (SPODs) for the follow-on coalition forces. HSVbased SEALs in southern Angola had made contact with the commander of the Angolan
Army, who was briefed on the operation. He was asked to provide local security at the southern port of Namibe, the planned coalition logistics hub. He indicated he could handle it with a company of light infantry, but would need transport for his troops. JFMCC planners are open to it, and given the asymmetry of future operations, we simply cannot afford to be standoffish about integrating JFMCC.
CONCLUSION
The role of the HSV in a military operation has been limited and mainly experimental to -date. Though it has already demonstrated tremendous potential for employment in a combat environment, the question of how the Joint Task Force will manage their employment in a future operation goes unanswered. Clearly, the complexity of the operation will dictate the organization and employment. Some operations will ask nothing more of an HSV than to shuttle people and equipment from point A to point B, and cross-component utilization will be a non-issue. Other situations may dictate a limited multi-mission application, but where asset apportionment for the operation's duration makes sense.
However, it is easy to plan for those situations and the real challenge is to figure out how to employ the HSV in a complex and dynamic environment, where robust multi-mission flexibility serves as a force multiplier.
It stands to reason that the HSV has tremendous potential as a maritime asset for the JFMCC, but also has a powerful role as a logistics and maneuver warfare asset as well. Its main operating area is that classic seam in joint operations, the littoral environment. In its transport role, it has a tremendous impact on JFLCC-focused land operations, while its aviation assets can also project power inland. In a matter of hours, it can shift gears into a classic JFMCC sea control role, hunting submarines with airborne dipping sonar. The JFMCC organization is in the best position to properly manage and integrate this multimission platform, but it will not come easy. JFMCC doctrine must be written to enable dynamic and robust use of the HSV across component boundaries, and it is better to do this now than to read about it in the next operation's "lessons learned" message.
